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ABSTRACT 
The primary focus of this thesis is to produce an 
analysis of collaborative technology advancements 
experienced through the experimental cycles which the 
members of the Naval Postgraduate School Center for Network 
Innovation and Experimentation (CENETIX) participate. These 
experiments, which include Maritime Interdiction Operations 
(MIO) and Tactical Network Topology (TNT) scenarios, have 
advanced a great deal since their inception and there is a 
need for a detailed study into which changes have produced 
the greatest benefits to NPS and our partners. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
In military operations, information has 
always been every bit as vital as fuel or 
ammunition in achieving favorable outcomes. 
Today, the need to reduce decision timelines 
highlights its importance. The Navy postulates 
that network centric operations will enhance the 
effectiveness of combat systems by allowing 
commanders to mass effects from great distances. 
At issue is verification of this assumption. 
Perry et al. (2002) 
A. BACKGROUND 
There has never been a time in written history where 
technological advances have come at humanity at such a 
blazing speed. It is for this reason that the United States 
military and those directed to defend the homeland must 
develop methods for communicating faster and more securely 
than ever thought possible. The possibilities for our 
enemies, both foreign and domestic, to utilize newer and 
cheaper technological advancements against us in order to 
do us harm grow on a daily basis and our sheer size 
determines our inability to keep on the bleeding edge of 
advancement. Van Creveld states, “As of the opening years 
of the twenty-first century, the mightiest, richest, best-
equipped, best-trained armed forces that have ever existed 
are in full decline and are, indeed, looking into an 
abyss.” 
It is this precipice of disorder, which is brought 
about by our enemy’s use of asymmetrical warfare methods 
that drives the development of programs such as the Center 
for Network Innovation and Experimentation (CENETIX), 
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located at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA. 
Since its inception, the program has been involved in the 
Field Experimentation Cooperative Program along with 
Department of Defense (DoD) entities, specifically United 
States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), and numerous 
governmental research facilities that focus their expertise 
on areas that range from nuclear and biological agents to 
biometric identification. Simply put, the mission of the 
program is to enable operators on the front lines, whether 
they be a Boarding Officer at sea or a checkpoint guard in 
the Bavarian Alps, the ability to collect passive or active 
data on a target. They should then have the ability to 
expeditiously send it back to a designated subject matter 
expert who can provide pertinent feedback via the provided 
computer network connection. This seemingly simple concept 
could bring the knowledge of experts, such as those at 
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories, right onto the 
deck of a dhow in the middle of the Arabian Gulf, possibly 
aiding in the identification of nuclear agents that 
previously would have been overlooked. 
The experiments, which have taken place thus far, have 
pushed the boundaries of network operations and have 
exhibited the values we strive for when we talk about 
Network Centric Warfare (NCW). While the initial purpose of 
the experiments was to facilitate the above mentioned 
information exchange through the use of numerous network 
technologies, the current iteration of the program is 
something much bigger. It is for this reason that the 
opportunity is being taken to analyze past and present 
progress in order to identify, in an actionable way, what 
has and has not been deemed successful. 
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B. OBJECTIVES 
The objectives of this study revolve around the 
ability of the various partnerships and technological 
combinations to provide the greatest benefit for all 
participating governmental, commercial, and educational 
entities. While there are numerous paths to success, the 
dynamic nature of the particular mission statements, which 
are held by each partner, mean that compromises may need to 
be made by some for the good of the entire group. This is 
not unlike the problems that consistently are faced by 
Department of Defense and Coalition Partners on a daily 
basis. A goal of this thesis is to determine at what point 
participation in the CENETIX experiments have historically 
proven to be more beneficial and to attempt to develop a 
model that would exploit those positive attributes in a 
timelier fashion. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Trends and Analysis 
• What opportunities have exhibited themselves 
that deserve further experimental 
exploration? 
• What successful experimental attributes can 
be extracted through analysis that may have 
not been previously noted and acted upon? 
2. Capabilities 
• Do current network capabilities serve the 
needs of experimental participants ranging 
from the Boarding Officer to the remote 
experts and observers? 
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• Would the addition of more commercial 
partnerships accelerate or inhibit 
capabilities? 
• What capabilities have shown the most 
promise from networking, collaboration, and 
situational awareness perspectives? 
3. Data Sharing 
• Are the methods for data sharing made clear 
to all participants within the experiment? 
Are back-up collaboration avenues understood 
by all participants? 
• Are the collaboration tools, which are 
currently used, robust enough for more 
complex and dispersed operational 
environments? 
• Is there a single collaboration product or 
combination of products that could possibly 
serve the needs of all experimental 
partners? 
D. SCOPE 
The scope of this thesis is left intentionally broad 
in order to facilitate the on-going nature of the Field 
Experimentation Cooperative Program and to allow other 
researchers to perform further analysis in accordance with 
any number of research methodologies. Because the 
participation of such a varied group of partners is the 
hallmark of CENETIX research, a narrowing of the scope 
would lessen the degree that this analysis could be 
applied. To that end, this thesis will be used to analyze 
trends since the inception of the program through the 
experiment cycle designated as MIO 08-4. 
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E. METHODOLOGY 
The methodology includes information gathered on the 
Global Information Grid (GIG), United States Special 
Operations Command (USSOCOM) capabilities, and extensive 
research of available literature, both hard copy and 
electronic, on wired and wireless computer network theories 
and practices. The author’s intent was to develop ideas in 
accordance with a diverse group of professional and 
academic sources that directly pertain to ‘feasibility and 
constraints analysis experiments’ (TNT 08-2 OFDM 802.16 
point paper). Additionally, the author focused on the 
extensive body of knowledge that has been collected in 
accordance with both the Tactical Network Topology (TNT) 
and Maritime Interdiction Operation (MIO) experiment cycles 
since 2005. These ever evolving experiments, led by Dr. 
Dave Netzer and Dr. Alex Bordetsky, primarily take place at 
Camp Roberts, CA and San Francisco, CA respectively. 
F. ORGANIZATION OF THIS THESIS 
The organization of this thesis is as follows: 
Chapter I is consists of the introduction and the 
overview of this thesis. In this section, the author laid 
out the background, objectives, research questions, scope, 
and methodology. 
Chapter II includes a comprehensive study into the 
myriad of collaborative tools, which have been used within 
the past few years, from the perspective of an NPS Network 
Operations Center (NOC) facilitator. Additionally, an 
analysis will be put forth that describes which suites have  
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been the most successful in filling the needs of the 
largest number of operators and subject matter experts 
(SME). 
Chapter III will cover current, past and future sites 
and partnerships. In this chapter, the author will go more 
in depth into each of the sites that utilize the programs 
that are laid out within Chapter II. This chapter will also 
discuss the role of each specific site and to what extent 
each partnership has been successful at fulfilling the 
needs of each of the experimental partners. 
Chapter IV shall include a comprehensive study into 
the myriad of collaborative theories and trends that have 
been explored by NPS researchers concerning the TNT/MIO 
experiments. The intent will be to attempt to discern a 
credible vision for CENETIX from the numerous bodies of 
work on the subject of collaboration and feedback 
mechanisms. 
Chapter V will be used as the conclusion for this 
extensive retrospective look into collaboration within the 
CENETIX program. It is here that feedback is provided for 
improving the CENETIX partnership and strengthening the 
areas that may need more attention. This portion of the 




II. COLLABORATIVE TOOLS 
A. CENETIX SITUATIONAL AWARENESS ENVIRONMENT 
Developed in 2002 (Klopson and Burdian, 2005) by 
Eugene Bourakov, the CENETIX Situational Awareness (SA) 
tool has undergone extensive upgrades to facilitate the 
evolutionary nature of this experimental organization. 
Initially built to remotely control UAVs, the program has 
been adapted to track High Value Targets (HVT) as well as 
to monitor network backbone nodes. Additionally, the SA 
server command line interface can be utilized, via GPRS 
cell phones or IRIDIUM hand-sets, to transmit Point of 
Interest (POI) data to an Unmanned Aerial Sensor (UAS) in 
order to collect digital reconnaissance data (TNT 08-3 
QLR).  
In general, the highly modifiable SA environment, that 
employs readily available Flash MX technology, is 
indispensible within the TNT MIO experiments. This 
collaboration solution takes some of the best attributes 
from numerous programs and integrates them into a 
relatively lightweight suite, which can be utilized by any 
user that has access to the internet. Klopson and Burdian 
successfully completed an extensive study of the 
functionality of both the SA environment and server in 2005 
which should be referred to for further information.   
B. MICROSOFT GROOVE 
As early as 2003, it was commonly understood by NPS 
researchers that the inclusion of a Commercial Off-the-
Shelf (COTS) collaboration solution was going to play a 
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pivotal part in any feasible solution to the multi-
organizational communication hurdle. Although the CENETIX 
SA environment has some impressive strengths, the ability 
to utilize an entire ‘virtual office suite’ could free up 
developmental resources to perform more pressing 
experimental duties, such as network management and 
trouble-shooting.  
According to Microsoft (2008), Groove “is a 
collaboration software program that helps teams work 
together dynamically and effectively, even if team members 
work for different organizations, work remotely, or work 
offline.” The CENETIX partnership generally utilized the 
chat, discussion board, and file repository functions 
within the Groove suite. A benefit of the program is the 
ability to instant message individual participants within 
the experiment. It is also advantageous to have all of the 
members of the workspace listed along the left side of the 
window, as seen in Figure 1, to include their activity 
status (In workspace, Online, & Offline). 
The functionality of Groove has periodically been 
hampered by an unexpected learning curve during recent 
experiments. This learning curve revolves around the 
installation of the program on remote computers and the 
specific manner in which the CENETIX team uses the 
workspaces. Installation problems come about because of the 
registration keys and invitations used to both install the 
program and to join specific CENETIX workgroups. Because of 
the server-client structure of this program it would be 
more beneficial if the installation was more intuitive and 
if the keys distribution could be more automated.  
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Currently a new user must request a new installation key 
from Mike Clement, and then they must be invited to each 
individual workspace. 
 
Figure 1.   Groove Workspace 
 
Mr. Clement has alleviated many of the ‘growing pains’  
that were first felt while using this program by 
proactively testing and troubleshooting installations and 
workspace functionality prior to the beginning of each 
experiment cycle, most notably 08-3 and 08-4. 
This heightened level of attention to the problems 
with Groove came about in direct response to lessons 
learned during TNT 08-2. According to the 08-2 AAR, “Users 
signed on at Aarhus Harbour site (TOC, vessel) were not 
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able to see each other online,” files larger than 10Mb 
would halt all message synchronization, and multiple 
workspaces caused general confusion within the remote 
sites. The first two problems could be attributed to 
server-client nature of the program, while the workspace 
confusion was alleviated by on-site training by NPS 
personnel. In general, these problems were lessened to a 
great extent by 08-4 because of the relative 
familiarization by all of the experimental partners. To 
continue this positive trend, it is suggested that each 
experiment begin with a run-down by administrators of 
alternative methods of communication, such as the 
Observer’s Notepad and VC1, in case Groove goes down. 
C. PANYNJ JOINT SITUATIONAL AWARESNESS SYSTEM (JSAS) 
The solution chosen by the Port Authority of New York 
& New Jersey (PANYNJ) to address the problem of cross-
agency communications is the Joint Situational Awareness 
System. When testifying before the U.S. Senate Committee on 
Commerce, Science, and Technology, Anthony Coscia, the 
Chairman of PANYNJ stated that “JSAS is a DHS-funded, DoD 
managed and Port Authority-led multi-agency project to 
build an information sharing and collaboration network 
among key operations centers in the New York and New Jersey 
port region.  Regional partners include the States of New 
York and New Jersey and the City of New York.  DHS 
sponsorship is via the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office 
(DNDO).” This extremely compact suite of applications is 
tasked with the mission of providing “shared situational 
awareness and a common operational picture of security 
events and other emergencies” (JSAS Overview, 2007) to a 
 11
consortium of local emergency responders. The organizations 
presently included are the PANYNJ, the New York State 
office of Homeland Security (NYS OHS), the Metropolitan 
Transportation Authority (MTA), the New Jersey Office of 
Homeland Security and Preparedness (NJ OHSP), and the New 
York City Office of Emergency Management (NYC OEM) to 
include other New York City governmental agencies. The 




Figure 2.   JSAS Geographic Distribution  
(From JSAS White Paper, 2007) 
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The JSAS is a comprehensive solution that was built on 
the premise that 80 percent of the information and 
functionality provided by the portal should be 
understandable by any user within a three minute training 
session. This ambitious requirement is made more important 
by the fact that the system was developed to be used by 
decision makers during natural or man-made disasters, 
rather than on a daily basis. All indications during the 
TNT MIO 08-4 experiments are that the team has been 
extremely successful at attaining this measure of 
operability.  
During the TNT MIO 08-4 experiments, which began on 
September 8, 2008, the JSAS was utilized by all 
participants as the main avenue for communicating the 
status of the MIO scenario, to include alerts and weather 
data. The main portions of the suite that were taken 
advantage of were the JSA Portal, which provides real-time 
threat advisory alerts, and the JSA Executive Viewer, shown 
in Figure 3, which “brings together the various information 
sources including video, alert, map, and contact 
information” (JSAS Overview, 2007).  
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Figure 3.   JSAS Executive Viewer 
(From JSAS White Paper, 2007) 
In addition to the Portal and the Executive Viewer, 
the JSAS provides a comprehensive Collaboration Services 
(Figure 4) system that can provide voice, video, and text 
collaboration through a PC, a phone of video 
teleconferencing system (VTC), and the JSA Network 
Monitoring System, which encourages sustainability of the 
project by collecting and authenticating the status and 
content of the various network enabled sensors. 
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Figure 4.   JSAS Collaborative Service 
(From JSAS White Paper, 2007) 
As a whole, the PANYNJ JSAS solution is an extremely 
encouraging step in the right direction for multi-agency 
collaboration and knowledge sharing, although it does have 
room for improvement in the realm of ad hoc communications 
between individual experimenters. During the 08-4 
experiment cycle, NPS personnel did maintain their standard 
suite of collaborative avenues (SA, Google Earth, and 
Observer’s Notepad) in conjunction with JSAS in order to 
facilitate continuity with the partners who were not 
familiar with JSAS. 
Possibly the most remarkable portion of the suite is 
the ability to bring together video and sensor data from 
all over the New York City area, including ad hoc feeds 
from outside organizations like CENETIX, into a 
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comprehensible format is very impressive. Additionally, the 
ability of the suite enable decision makers the option to 
communicate via numerous avenues while experts on the 
ground are able to inject minute-by-minute updates, via 
alerts, is imperative to the mission they are trying to 
accomplish. The purposeful ease of use and simplicity only 
adds to the allure of this collaborative option although it 
still falls short as an all encompassing solution. 
D. CENETIX OBSERVER’S NOTEPAD 
The ability to accurately analyze what has happened 
during an experiment is paramount. When one considers the 
work load that each participant is tasked with during the 
typical scenario it is understood that information 
gathering is necessary, yet difficult. While the Observer’s 
Notepad is not acknowledged as a true collaborative tool, 
it does an exceptional job at enabling retrospective 
analysis of the information gathered, especially from the 
network management perspective. Entries by participants are 
time stamped and organized into chapters based on the 
specific experimental cycle.  
Recent changes, shown in Figure 5, by Eugene Bourakov 
to include screen names and the ability to upload pictures 
are welcome improvements that will only further the 
notepads usability. It should also be noted that the 
notepad is also utilized by NOC personnel when other 
collaborative technologies appear to go down.  
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Figure 5.   Observer’s Notepad 
 
E. CENETIX VIDEO CONFERENCE ROOMS  
The sheer range of CBR agents that a boarding team 
could be faced with, in addition to traditional weapons and 
the possibilities of both drug and/or human trafficking, 
make it impossible to have all of the expertise needed 
within a single team. It is for this reason that real-time 
video transmissions have been at the forefront of the 
desired capabilities list for the CENETIX partners. 
Although this has subsequently been accomplished through 
many systems, such as Groove and JSAS, the CENETIX video 
conference rooms, commonly referred to as VC1, VC2, and 
VR3, are at the core of the partnerships capabilities.  
Through the use of these web-based portals Boarding 
Officers (BO) have been able to successfully stream video 
to and from the Tactical Operations Center (TOC) while 
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going aboard suspect vessels and performing their assigned 
searches and seizures. This capability is extended by the 
ability to chat, send data files, and communicate via voice 
to anyone within the portal. During the experiments between 
December 2006 and September 2008, the only notable problem, 
experienced within this approach to communicating with the 
boarding party, from a collaborative standpoint, is the 
inability to pull all partners into the same room if 
another one becomes inoperable due to hardware or network 
issues. This problem was mitigated to some extent by 
providing hands-on training at partner sites by NPS 
students. One notable upgrade, brought about by the 
addition of Video Room 3 (Figure. 6), is the ability record 
or upload and store data feeds in a browser-embedded Flash 
player for review after the completion of the experiment. 
This capability will no doubt be extremely beneficial as 
the After Action Reports (AAR) are composed. 
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Figure 6.   VR3 Video – Live TOC/Recorded BO. 
 
F. CENETIX IP BASED VIDEO FEEDS  
In addition to browser based portals, the CENETIX Lab 
also utilizes a wide range of IP based cameras, most 
notably from Pelco, to capture and share data across the 
network. These cameras are each assigned a static IP 
address within the 192.168.99.xxx sub-domain and they can 
be accessed using the Pelco internet browser plug-in. 
Through this proprietary plug-in some cameras can be 
controlled from the pan/tilt and zoom perspectives. This 
method of access has also been used to provide video 
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feedback from numerous autonomous platforms to include 
unmanned aerial vehicles and unmanned surface vehicles. 
Figure 7 is an exceptional example of an aerial pursuit and 
observation from two UAVs and a static camera placed on the 
communication tower at Camp Roberts. This feed was 
captured, without any noticeable lag or interference, at 
the Network Operations Center, located nearly 100 miles 
away in Monterey via the 802.16 OFDM wireless backbone. 
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III. MAJOR COLLABORATIVE SITES AND ROLES 
A. MILITARY PARTNERSHIPS 
1. United States Special Operations Command 
“The United States Special Operations Command” 
(USSOCOM or SOCOM) is the Unified Combatant Command charged 
with overseeing the various Special Operations Commands 
(SOC or SOCOM) of the Army, Air Force, Navy and Marine 
Corps” (Wikipedia, 2008). As the primary sponsor for the 
TNT/MIO experiments, USSOCOM directly contributes to the 
relevancy of the scenarios that are performed at Camp 
Roberts and in the San Francisco Bay area. These scenarios 
are intended to hit right at the heart of the practical 
mission laid out by Admiral Eric T. Olson, Commander 
USSOCOM, when he spoke to the Naval Postgraduate School 
student body. The Admiral stated that “Technology is only 
good when it is useful. Shape your product for the 
warfighter. Do not ask them to subscribe to your hobby.” He 
went on to say that our forces “do not need more shiny 
objects.”(NPS SGL, 2008)  
The no-nonsense charge by Admiral Olson does not fall 
on deaf ears. Mr. James Cluck, Director of Special 
Operation Networks and Computers (SONC), identified the 
need to “foster inter-agency cooperation” and the need to 
“obtain persistent Intelligence, Surveillance, & 
Reconnaissance (ISR)” systems as command priorities within 
USSOCOM. Subsequently, the intent of the USSOCOM-NPS 
cooperative is to provide exactly the relevant networking 
and collaborative technologies that the warfighter can put 
into use with minimal experience and maximum reliability. 
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The specific objective is “to provide an independent 
assessment capability to evaluate effectiveness, 
affordability, and feasibility of future capabilities, and 
to provide a unique education and research environment for 
students and faculty at NPS. Secondary objectives include 
examining dual-use capabilities for homeland security, 
stabilization, reconstruction, and disaster 
relief/humanitarian assistance, and for other government 
agencies” (08-3 QLR, 2008). This unique mixture of NPS 
faculty and military student researchers, in conjunction 
with SOCOM operatives, is paramount in achieving a true 
network-centric warfare (NCW) model. Perry et al. (2002), 
define NCW as “the linking of platforms into one, shared 
awareness network in order to obtain information 
superiority, get inside the opponents decision cycle, and 
end conflict quickly.” The extraordinary relationship 
between military students and boots on the ground 
operatives greatly enhances the ability of the cooperative 
to meet this DoD wide goal.  
2. United States Coast Guard 
If there is one organization that could fully benefit 
from the MIO research performed within the CENETIX 
experimental scenarios, it is the U.S. Coast Guard. The 
role of the USCG within the Department of Homeland Security 
is driven by a responsibility to monitor our coastal 
waterways, to include riverine areas to ensure that neither 
dangerous persons nor materials breech our borders. Just as 
the Clinger-Cohen Act eventually revolutionized the mindset 
within the Department of Defense, the Maritime Security Act 
of 2002 and the Security and Accountability For Every Port 
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(SAFE) Act of 2006 (SAFE) will both play a large part in 
modernizing the Command and Control (C2) systems within the 
USCG. Both of these Acts have specific stipulations that 
require a much more vigorous look at information sharing, 
collaboration, and contingency planning through a layered 
defense architecture. This push toward information fusion 
or Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) was also reiterated by 
the President in his National Strategy for Maritime 
Security. In fact, that strategy defines MDA as “an 
effective understanding of anything in the maritime 
environment that can affect the safety, security, economy, 
or environment of the United States” (Coscia, 2008). From 
this viewpoint the participation within the MIO experiments 
by the USCG is much more than just a simple exercise in 
logistics, they are stakeholders with a vested interest in 
the success of the research that is performed. 
B. GOVERNEMENTAL PARTNERSHIPS 
1. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories 
The long standing participation of LLNL within the 
TNT-MIO experiments is advantageous on a multitude of 
levels, as explained by Dr. Alex Bordetsky. “The 
operational focus of NPS-LLNL experiments is on finding 
viable solutions for MIO connectivity and collaboration 
providing for rapid radiation detection, biometrics 
identification, non-proliferation machinery parts search, 
and explosive materials detection on board the target 
vessel during the boarding party search phase. The Testbed 
includes mesh and long-haul wireless networking with 
radiation detection sensors, boarding party collaboration 
with remote expert teams, and reachback to different 
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locations around the globe” (Bordetsky, et al. 2006). To 
simplify, LLNL not only provides remote expert intelligence 
in regards to radioactive materials, but they also provide 
critical communication solutions to include Ultra-Wideband 
radios (UWB).  
Most notable among LLNL’s collaborative contributions 
is their ability to remotely identify radioactive material 
based on signature data which is gathered by any number of 
provided sensors. The sensors to include externally mounted 
drive-by models, handheld units such as the IdentiFINDER, 
and the Adaptable Radiation Area Monitor (ARAM), 
illustrated in Figure 8. While the handheld IdentiFINDER, 
shown in Figure 9, is meant to be used by Boarding Party 
(BP) members involved in Maritime Interdiction Operations 
(MIO), the ARAM system was developed to be “a portable 
system that can detect small amounts of radioactive 
materials from a distance. When radioactive material is 
detected, ARAM photographs the area, collects high-
resolution spectral data for analysis, and rapidly sends 
the information to a first responder” (Vergino, 2004).  
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Figure 8.   LLNL Adaptable Radiation Area Monitor 
(From Vergino, 2004) 
This sending of data to the first responder and then 
on to LLNL, via the TNT backbone, is the key to the 
collaboration that takes place between the BO and the 
remote knowledge expert who can instruct the BO on exactly 
what type of materials they are dealing with. Whether it be 
the legitimate components of a “dirty bomb” destined for 
our shores, or a container of smoke detectors, which each 
contain 0.9 micro curie of Americum-241 (McQuay, 2008), the 
first responder can rest assured that he will quickly be 
greeted by a positive or negative signature identification 
from the staff at LLNL, via the TNT Testbed. 
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Figure 9.   Thermo Scientific Isotope identiFINDER  
(From Thermo Scientific, 2008) 
In conclusion, both sensors are part of a study to 
detect nuclear weapons of mass destruction and radiological 
“dirty bombs” in remote locations which help CENETIX meet 
the problem that was illuminated by General Mattis, USMC, 
during a recent visit to the Naval Postgraduate School. In 
his current position as the Supreme Allied Commander of 
Transformation and the Commander of U.S. Joint Forces 
Command, he has a unique picture of our military 
capabilities and priorities. He stated that “One of the two 
main technological areas we must address is our ability to 
identify Weapons of Mass Destruction coming into our 
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airports and seaports” (NPS SGL, 2008). Luckily that is 
precisely the mission that LLNL has taken on, with the help 
of CENETIX, within the TNT-MIO experiments. 
2. Biometrics Fusion Center 
Established in 2000 in Clarksburg, West Virginia, the 
Department of the Army Biometrics Task Force Biometrics 
Fusion Center is utilized as a remote expert site during 
the CENETIX experiments.  
The BFC performs test and evaluation of 
Commercial Off-the-Shelf (COTS) biometrics, 
supports the development of standards and 
performance measures, provides biometric 
repository support as required, and provides 
technical implementation and integration support 
to Department of Defense (DoD) Biometrics. Among 
its core functions are synchronizing and 
integrating existing and new technologies 
throughout DoD; providing identity dominance, 
protection, and management through integrated 
joint biometric programs; and establishing and 
maintaining an authoritative biometric data 
source in order to provide timely, accurate and 
comprehensive Identity Superiority to the 
warfighter. (WV Biometrics Initiative Website, 
2008)  
Just as LLNL provides expert radiological advice 
remotely, the BFC is responsible for assisting boarding 
parties or check point personnel with up to the minute data 
pertaining to suspected persons of interest. Obviously this 
must be performed through the use of an extremely robust 
database in conjunction with some method of network 
communication between the field operator and the BFC. At 
the present time, this is performed by using a dedicated 
VPN connection between the TNT-MIO Testbed and the BFC as 
shown in Figure 10, while the more generalized view from 
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sensor to VPN can be seen in Figure ll. Because of the 
possible hostile nature of Maritime Interdiction, the 
ultimate goal of CENETIX has been to decrease the time 
between data acquisition and the response from the Fusion 
Center, while concurrently increasing the reliability of 
the network connection between the two. Just as with any 
experiment, this desire to improve communication has called 
for a certain amount of ingenuity. 
 
Figure 10.   Network Topology Reach Back to BFC 
(From 08-2 After Action Report, 2008) 
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Figure 11.   Biometrics Sensor Reach Back to BFC 
(From 08-2 After Action Report, 2008) 
For example, during the Aarhus, Denmark MIO portion of 
08-2, the biometrics data that was collected on the target 
vessel (see Figure 12) was not able to pass directly back 
to the BFC via the provided global network because of a 
problem with FTP permissions (NIPRNET). In this specific 
case, Groove was also not performing as expected, so it was 
not an option for signature transmission. The decision was 
made to manually intervene and exchange files via e-mail, 
which enabled a positive identification of the person of 
interest. Although this was not the preferred method for 
information exchange, it did provide a positive match, 
which is considered a success from a collaboration stand 
point. In the future, a positive FTP access test should be 
performed in order to alleviate this type of trivial 
problem when attempting to reach back to the BFC. 
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Figure 12.   Crew biometrics gathering in Aarhus  
(From 08-2 After Action Report, 2008) 
C. CONTRIBUTING FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC PARTNERS 
1. Port Authority – New York / New Jersey 
The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, 
established in 1921, is a bi-state organization responsible 
for an area of about 1,500 square miles centered on the 
Statue of Liberty, as shown in Figure 13 (PANYNJ website, 
2008). PANYNJ is also responsible for a majority of the 
regional transformational infrastructure, including 
tunnels, bridges, airport, and seaports within the New 
York-New Jersey Port district (Wikipedia, 2008). While the 
Port Authority does manage the Port Newark-Elizabeth Marine 
Terminal, which is the largest on the Eastern Seaboard, 
their ownership of the World Trade Center has been cause 
for the largest changes within the organization. During the 
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fatal terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center on 
September 11, 2001, the organization's headquarters, which 
was located in Tower 1, was destroyed, taking with it the 
lives of 84 employees, 37 of whom were police officers or 
commanders(PANYNJ Annual Report, 2002). 
 
Figure 13.   PANYNJ Area of Responsibility  
(From PANYNJ.gov, 2008) 
This tragedy brought about a sea change within the 
organization that revolved around a much broader command 
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and control structure, which could more readily react to 
attacks or incidents within their region. This is achieved 
through the formation of geographically dispersed Emergency 
Response Centers, as seen in Figures 14 & 15, and through 
the use of satellite enabled Emergency Response Vehicles 
(Figure 16). This is precisely where the concepts that have 
been explored through the CENETIX TNT Testbed come in, 
since the concept of distributed C2 has been extensively 
studied through the use of the Tactical Operations Center 
(TOC) and Network Operations Center (NOC) paradigms. In 
addition to the TOC and NOC, the interjection of feedback 
by a multitude of domestic and international partners to 
the scenario-driven MIO experiments promises to provide 
PANYNJ with answers to the problems which they have been 
trying to solve since that fateful day in 2001.  
 
Figure 14.   PANYNJ Emergency Response Center  
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Figure 15.   PANYNJ Emergency Response Center Alternate 
 
Figure 16.   PANYNJ Emergency Response Vehicle 
 34
It is well known that the Port Authority has decades 
of experience in law enforcement, bridge/tunnel 
construction and protection, and port security that can be 
of great value to the other CENETIX partners. Although the 
level of diversity within the organization is difficult to 
grasp, it is not unlike the broad range of responsibilities 
shared by the U.S. Coast Guard. In fact, the inclusion of 
both of these entities will hopefully lead to partnerships, 
which will ease the burden felt by both organizations in 
the realm of radiation detection, information sharing, and 
force protection. The participation of the PANYNJ has been 
a welcome addition to the experiments since TNT-MIO 07-3 
(Mercado, 2008). During the MIO 08-4 experiment cycle, the 
NPS team transitioned from the West Coast to the East Coast 
in order to demonstrate their capabilities in and around 
the Newark region. During this on-site experiment, PANYNJ 
brought in numerous new partners, which are shown in Table 
1. 
 
Table 1.   PANYNJ MIO Experiment Partners. 
(After TNT-MIO 08-4 Scenario, 2008) 
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2. San Francisco Bay Area Law Enforcement 
During the MIO portion of the CENETIX experiments, 
assets are provided in the form of transportation, relay 
access, and manpower from the Alameda County Sherriff’s 
Marine Unit (06-4), the San Francisco Police Marine Unit 
(06-3), the Golden Gate National Recreation Area U.S. Park 
Police (07-1), and the Oakland Police Special Operations 
Unit (06-4). The numbers within parenthesis following the 
unit name represents the first TNT-MIO experiment cycle 
which they participated in. Each of these organizations 
provides intelligence reports and interdiction tactics to 
further assist the C2 elements in finding maritime 
terrorists or High Value Targets (HVT) (Mercado, 2008).  
The network, which is demonstrated during the Maritime 
Interdiction Operations, performed within the San Francisco 
Bay area most closely represents the layout which is 
illustrated in Figure 17. As can be seen, the topology is 
used to demonstrate the abilities of numerous technologies 
to include Self-Aligning OFDM 802.16 (SAOFDM), which is 
used for ship-to-ship and ship-to-shore communications; 
Ultra-Wideband, which is used for through-the-deck 
communications; Wave Relay and ITT mesh relay, which are 
sued to connect numerous sensors and vessels; and TACHYON 
satellite nodes, which are primarily used for reachback 
from remote riverine areas. The majority of these 
communication platforms could be easily mounted and 
exhibited from any number of Bay Area Law Enforcement 
assets in order to provide extended C2 capabilities. 
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Figure 17.   San Francisco Bay Area Network Topology 
(From TNT-MIO 08-2 AAR, 2008) 
3. Coalition Partners 
The inclusion of geographically disbursed foreign and 
coalition partners, as seen in Figure 18, has brought about 
a broader perspective than was seen when the experiments 
were of an entirely domestic nature. Since 2005, the 
following partners have been added, with the corresponding 
TNT-MIO cycle noted in parentheses: Swedish Naval Warfare 
Center (06-3), National University of Singapore (06-4), 
Salzburg Research (07-3), University of Bundeswehr (UoB) at 
Munich (07-3), the Danish Navy Training Center (08-2), and 
the Turkish Air Force Academy (08-2) (Mercado, 2008). 
Because the concept of Joint warfare is at the epicenter of 
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current military dogma, the addition of the coalition 
partners adds to the real world scenario driven environment 
which is being fostered within the CENETIX experiments.  
 
Figure 18.   Domestic and Coalition Sites 
(After Michael Clement, 2008) 
The progression from remote observers and 
collaborators to primary experiment participants by the 
European partners, which are geographically distributed as 
shown in Figure 19, took place during the MIO 08-2 
experimental cycle. The institutions, which increased their 
roles dramatically by hosting the NPS team, included the 
Swedish Naval Warfare Center (SNWC) in Karlskrona, Salzburg 
Research near the German-Austrian border, the University of 
Bundeswehr (UoB) in Munich, Germany, and the Danish Navy 
Training Center located in Aarhus, Denmark. The relatively 
close proximity of each partner lent itself very well to 
the scenario, which is described below. 
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Figure 19.   European Partner Locations 
 
The specific contributions during MIO 08-2 revolved 
around a scenario in which a suspected radiological/nuclear 
source was detected within a vehicle at a checkpoint along 
the German border. Following identification of the source 
by remote experts at LLNL, the occupants were scanned 
biometrically and the car was tagged, released, and 
monitored as it traveled across Germany, through the Port 
at Gdynia, and into Sweden. The specific route, which was 
successfully monitored by all remote participants is shown 
in Figure 20, via a time lapsed screen capture of the 




collaborative contributions of the European partners with 
the tagging and tracking of the experimental High Value 
Target (HVT) are listed below. 
 
Figure 20.   HVT remotely tracked across Europe 
(From MIO 08-2 AAR, 2008) 
a. UoB in Munich, Germany  
The University of Bundeswehr has played an 
extensive role within the MIO experimentation by providing 
a great deal of experience with the checkpoint operations. 
(A. Bordetsky, personal interview, October 29, 2008) This 
includes the use of the LLNL ARAM sensor (Figure 21) to 
identify HVT vehicle, the act of physically locating the 
radiological/nuclear item within the vehicle (Figures 22 & 
23), the biometric scans of the occupants (Figures 24 & 
25), and the tagging of the suspect vehicle for tracking 
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via a prototype GPS tagging device (Figure 25). It should 
be noted that positive rad/nuc agent identification took 
place within three minutes between the checkpoint team and 
the remote experts at LLNL (MIO 08-2 AAR, 2008). 
 
Figure 21.   Vehicle configured with LLNL ARAM sensor 
(From MIO 08-2 AAR, 2008) 
 
Figure 22.   The nuclear radiation source is discovered 
(From MIO 08-2 AAR, 2008) 
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Figure 23.   Camera Lens used to set off ARAM Sensor 
(From MIO 08-2 AAR, 2008) 
 
Figure 24.   Biometric data is gathered from suspects 
(From MIO 08-2 AAR, 2008) 
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Figure 25.   Biometrics scanner and tag components 
(From MIO 08-2 AAR, 2008) 
 
Figure 26.   Prototype Location Tag inside HVT vehicle 
(From MIO 08-2 AAR, 2008) 
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b. SNWC in Karlskrona, Sweden 
While the participation of the Swedish Naval 
Warfare Center in Karlskrona during 08-2 was the first time 
they had hosted the NPS team during the experiments, they 
had been instrumental with certain technologies for some 
time. When interviewed, Dr. Alex Bordetsky identified the 
ability of SNWC to provide specialized MIO drive-by 
detection and sensor enabled vest technologies as their 
strongest contributions to the experiments. (A. Bordetsky, 
personal interview, October 29, 2008). In fact, during MIO 
08-2 the specified “goal for the Swedish team was to find 
the vehicle on board the ferry and take it for further 
biometric and nuclear radiation detection, including the 
use of a sensor vest and the Kockums unmanned surface 
vehicle” (MIO AAR 08-2). 
The Piraya tactical unmanned surface vehicle 
(TUSV) that is employed by the Swedish team is an extremely 
modifiable prototype platform that measures in at 4m x 1.4m 
(Figure 27). The interchangeable payload consists of UHF, 
WLAN, 3G/UMTS/HDSPA, and satellite communication suites, 
LLNL provided rad/nuc sensors, and video capabilities. 
(Kockums Piraya TUSV Brief, 2008). Positional data was 
transmitted back to the Karlskrona TOC (Figure 28) via a 1 
Hz UHF channel, which was fed into the Distributed Blue 
Force Tracker Software (DBFT) suite. “Selected objects such 
as the positions of the Pirayas and selected AIS data sets 
(i.e., a suspect merchant vessel) were extracted, converted 
into Cursor-on-Target (CoT) data and submitted to the TNT 
network over the VPN. Server 1 also connected to PANYNJ 
JSAS. TOC server 2 ran Groove and the Google Earth based 
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common situational picture” (Lindh, MIO 08-4 AAR 
Contribution, 2008). This was a successful exhibition of 
real-time alerts and video (Figure 29) distributed across 
the entire TNT-MIO network which covers regional portions 
of Northern Europe and the United States. 
 
Figure 27.   Piraya TUSV during MIO 08-4 operations 
(From Lindh, MIO 08-4 AAR Contribution, 2008) 
 
Figure 28.   Karlskrona TOC SA view w/ Video, DBFT & JSAS 
(From Nilsson, 08-4 AAR Contribution, 2008) 
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Figure 29.   Streaming Video from Piraya TUSV 
(From MIO 08-4 AAR Draft, 2008) 
c. DNTC in Aarhus, Denmark  
The Danish Navy Training Center, in conjunction 
with Systematic, was responsible for the Interdiction phase 
of European portion of MIO 08-4. They chose to use a 
software tool called Systematics SitaWare Maritime Boarding 
Unit (Figure 30), which is a tool with biometrics, evidence 
gathering, tactical communications, and situational 
awareness (MIO 08-2 AAR, 2008). In addition, they also 
employed the TNT File Repository and Microsoft Groove to 
upload nuc/rad data from their LLNL ARAM equipped drive-by 
vessel (Figure 31). As with the DBFT software in Sweden, 
the SitaWare software uploaded CoT data to the TNT Alert 
server which was subsequently transposed into the NPS SA 
environment for everyone to observe. 
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Figure 30.   SitaWare Laptop and Fingerprint Reader 
(From MIO 08-2 AAR, 2008) 
 
Figure 31.   ARAM equipped vessel in Aarhus, Denmark 
(From MIO 08-2 AAR, 2008) 
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In the following experiment cycle, which happened 
to be MIO 08-4, the Aarhus team took a different direction 
by exploring the use of sonar to detect SCUBA divers within 
the Port of Aarhus while simultaneously transmitting CoT 
data back to the TNT Alert server. They also maintained a 
connection with the Biometrics Fusion Center in order to 
query their server regarding persons-of-interest. The map 
shown in Figure 32 shows the positions of the units during 
the exercise while Figure 33 shows the Deployable Sonar 
Command which was set up on the pier. The Command Center 
was comprised of a RESON Sonar system in conjunction with 
the Systematic Maritime C2 System, which is used for 
collaboration and intelligence gathering purposes much like 
the SitaWare system which was utilized in MIO 08-2. 
 
Figure 32.   Port of Aarhus Sonar Monitoring AOR 
(From Ridderberg, Aarhus Site AAR Contribution, 2008) 
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Figure 33.   Port of Aarhus Deployable Sonar Command 
(From Ridderberg, Aarhus Site AAR Contribution, 2008) 
As stated earlier, the goal of this scenario was 
to use Sonar technology to intercept a SCUBA diver within 
the Port of Aarhus despite the fact that there is normal 
maritime traffic within the area. The diver is equipped 
with a closed-circuit re-breather apparatus in order to 
avoid detection during his dive, as seen in Figure 34. Upon 
detection a “hostile diver” CoT alert is posted to the TNT 
server, and a group of first responders are expected to 
muster at the pier. The first responder team will be 
equipped with a Systematic Maritime C2 System, in addition 
to a Tactical Vest which will provide live video feeds, 
situational awareness, biometrics, and tactical messaging 
(Figure 35) (Ridderberg, Aarhus Site AAR Contribution, 
2008). Overall, the test was a success despite some 
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challenges with the Sound Velocity Profiles (SVP) which 
were affected by nearby high speed ferry vessels and some 
connectivity problems which were previously mentioned 
regarding the Biometrics Fusion Center. 
 
Figure 34.   SCUBA Diver with Closed-Circuit Re-Breather 
(From Ridderberg, Aarhus Site AAR Contribution, 2008) 
 
Figure 35.   First Responders equipped with Tactical Vest 
(From Ridderberg, Aarhus Site AAR Contribution, 2008) 
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IV. COLLABORATION 
It was once the prevalent sentiment down at the 
waterfront that the U.S. Navy Battle Group was meant to be 
self-sufficient once the last mooring line had been cast 
off, and the ships had disappeared over the horizon. At 
that time it was clearly understood that things such as 
aircraft availability was a function of what you could 
singularly accomplish onboard the carrier. Concurrently, 
this philosophy extended to Battle Group (BG) command and 
control (C2) and surveillance since so-called national 
(shore-based) surveillance assets were not trusted in 
anything other than peace time. The attitude of the time, 
which is up until the mid 1980s, was one of rugged 
individualism and a “do it on our own” mentality which was 
based on the belief that planners within the Washington 
beltway would not be capable of rendering decisions below 
the Battle Group level (Kirksey, 1984). This was simply 
because they were thought to not be technologically capable 
of managing the assets and intelligence in real time from 
such a great distance. Times have changed. 
In today’s Network Centric Warfare (NCW) model, the 
effects of numerous weapons platforms are massed, rather 
than the force which must be massed by traditional 
platform-centric entities to mass combat effectiveness.  
Because NCW forces are interdependent and act as one they 
are thought to be optimized versus the “on your own” 
mentality which previously prevailed. It is believed that 
this improvement in weapon system employment is a force 
multiplier, ultimately driving the idea that more accurate 
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targeting can be done with fewer weapons platforms. (Perry, 
et al., 2002) This concept is deeply dependent on one 
pivotal theory, and that is that control of the 
conglomeration of weapons platforms can be centrally 
controlled, which calls for a great deal of collaboration 
by parties not only within the theater of operation, but 
across the globe. 
The preceding chapters in this thesis were put forth 
to lay the ground work for a better understanding of just 
how dynamic the CENETIX Field Experimentation Cooperative 
Program and the TNT Testbed truly are. In addition to the 
numerous partners and communication platforms which have 
been exhibited over the past seven years, there has been a 
continuing theme of extending the boundaries of 
communication between heterogeneous sensors and nodes. The 
scenarios and vignettes which are displayed through out the 
TNT-MIO cycles are intended to most accurately depict the 
type of ad-hoc and dissimilar networks that could be 
encountered within any Area of Responsibility (AOR). The 
ability of the experimental partners to collaborate, or the 
“process in which a team of individuals works together to 
achieve a common goal” (Perry et al, 2002), is the subject 
of this chapter. Each body of work below will be 
interpreted in regards to its relevance to the most recent 
experiments and compared to the corresponding trends which 
have been noted by the author. 
A. COLLABORATION STUDY WITHIN CENETIX 
1. Klopson & Burdian (2005) 
In their graduate thesis titled “Collaborative 
Applications used in a Wireless Environment at Sea for use 
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in Coast Guard Law Enforcement and Homeland Security 
Missions,” LCDR Jadon E. Klopson and LT Stephen V. Burdian, 
both members of the United States Coast Guard, laid out the 
first extensive look at managing change and collaboration 
through the experience gathered during their CENETIX 
research. Their research is a fitting place to begin 
looking at the trends within the collaborative aspect of 
the TNT-MIO experiments specifically because they focus on 
the task of integrating technological change into existing 
organizations. While this does not fall directly under the 
purview of communications, the reluctance of stakeholders 
to embrace new collaborative tools has a direct effect on 
the perceived validity of a system.  
As with all of the military services, the USCG has an 
aging fleet that does not lend itself well to Coast Guard 
CIO’s vision that states that “The Coast Guard, as the 
world’s premier maritime service, delivers the right 
information to the right people at the right time” 
(Nacarra, 1998, as cited in Burdian and Klopson, 2005). It 
is for this reason that Klopson and Burdian used the 
example of the Integrated Deepwater System (IDS) transition 
as their example of the Coast Guard’s C4ISR modernization 
effort. Although the program has more recently been 
crippled by contractor intrigue and budgetary shortfalls, 
the initial asset integration, as shown in Figure 36, 
serves the purpose of these researchers. The overarching 
theme behind the need for an across-the-board maritime 
upgrade was to facilitate the precise types of information 




experimentation, to include boarding party communications, 
real-time biometric capabilities, and Weapons of Mass 
Destruction (WMD) detection.  
 
Figure 36.   Projected Integrated Deepwater System Assets 
(From Wikipedia.com, 2008) 
The previously listed Net-Centric capabilities are 
core responsibilities of the USCG, and according to Klopson 
and Burdian, they have been so hampered by the “current 
slow pace of information feedback that occurs because of 
lack connectivity, boarding teams have two options when 
awaiting results of an intelligence check, radiation 
evaluation, or other information request.” As a result of 
this inability to retrieve intelligence in a timely manner 
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the crew can either remain on board the subject vessel for 
an extended period of time, running up very high 
opportunity cost by not boarding other vessels, or they can 
depart the vessel. In the event that the requested 
information comes back warranting further action, the team 
must relocate and re-board the suspected vessel. While the 
first option detracts from overall unit effectiveness, the 
second lends itself to an extremely awkward situation 
whereas a suspected crew knows they are being reassessed 
for a reason, resulting in significantly higher levels of 
hostility and danger for the boarding party. It is no 
accident that this scenario is performed during every MIO 
experiment, regardless of location, with the goal of 
decreasing the amount of time it takes to get the proper 
intelligence into the hands of the boarding party. Put 
simply, the shorter the cycle time between information 
gathering and response, the better the chance to ameliorate 
both of the potential negative outcomes.  
Burdian and Klopson made one astonishingly overlooked 
observation, and that was that technology is of no use to 
anyone if it is not utilized. They also reported upon how 
difficult it is in such a broad organization to get 
stakeholder buy-in, whether it is from an E-2 Seaman or a 
“salty” Master Chief Petty Officer. It is precisely for 
that reason that they discussed the need for an extensive 
change management plan which lays out eight steps which 
should prove to be instrumental in carrying out any 
successful change. (Kotter, 1995, as cited in Burdian and 
Klopson, 2005). These steps, developed by change management 
guru, John Kotter, in his 1995 book titled Leading Change 
(“Kotter’s,” 2008), can be seen below in Table 2. 
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Table 2.   Kotter’s Eight Step Model. 
While these steps to change within an organization may 
seem ill fitted to a conversation about collaboration, the 
two are more in sync with one another than they initially 
appear. In fact, using these powerful milestones, which 
Burdian and Klopson applied to USCG communications, one 
could identify numerous strengths and weaknesses within the 
collaborative fabric of the CENETIX Maritime Interdiction 
Operations. To be more specific, the work of these two 
Coast Guard Officers could be said to have established a 
sense of urgency by identifying USCG and Homeland Security 
deficiencies in the wake of 9/11 that could be corrected 
with sufficient ship-to-ship and ship-to-shore WLAN 
capabilities. The formation of the CENETIX lab, with its 
numerous members from governmental, academic, and private 
sector organizations most definitely represents a powerful 
guiding coalition, as suggested in step two. Steps three 
and four are accomplished through the CENETIX vision 
statement which mandates the exploration of new frontiers 
in order to support advanced studies in wireless technology 
(Bordetsky, 2008). It is understood that this vision 
statement is pliable, which means that if a better idea 
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comes along then it should be explored. This belief in 
itself is responsible for taking care of step five, which 
is to remove obstacles to change and empower everyone to 
contribute to the stated mission.  
It is at this point in Kotter’s model that specific 
TNT_MIO experimental cycles can be taken into account. The 
planning that goes into each quarterly exercise is quite 
extensive and it focuses on the collation of a multitude of 
small vignettes that will all contribute to a larger 
mission. These smaller scenarios provide short term wins, 
as dictated by step six, that contribute to the overall 
morale within the stakeholders. Each success provides an 
opportunity to build on what went right and identify what 
could be improved. These successes, as well as problem 
areas, are recognized during the formation of the After 
Action Reports and the hope is that the lessons learned 
will contribute to pushing the boundaries even further in 
the next experiment, which would correspond with step 
seven. Finally, step eight contends that changes which are 
successful should be embedded within the culture of the 
partnership. The progressive nature of the MIO experiments 
has shown this to be the case within CENETIX over the past 
seven years. 
This is just a small portion of the comprehensive work 
that was performed by Burdian and Klopson, as it pertains 
to the CENETIX experiments. Some of the other areas that 
they discuss that are important to the field of 
collaborative studies include the fear regarding the loss 
of power by previously autonomous combatant commanders, or 
the big brother theory, and the resistance to technological 
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change by service members who are content with their 
present operational configurations. Both of these ‘wicked 
problems’ can and should be addressed within the CENETIX 
environment in an effort to find a solution that could 
grease the way for a new culture, in addition to new 
technology. 
2. Bordetsky & Friman (2007) 
a. Introduction 
One of the greatest assets, as was mentioned in 
the introduction of this thesis, to CENETIX is the 
participation of military personnel within the experiments.  
In addition to utilizing the fleet experience of military 
Officers from around the world as thesis student, Dr. 
Bordetsky teaches a once-yearly course fittingly titled 
Collaborative Technologies (IS 4188), from which students 
produce TNT-MIO related seminars and final projects. 
According to the NPS student catalog,  
The first part of the course is based on the 
analysis of collaboration in different human 
organizations and the requirements to agent-based 
decision support architecture. The second part of 
the course is focused on studies of intelligent 
agents and multiple agent architecture From the 
beginning of the course students are involved in 
the hands-on practice with wireless collaborative 
environments including GPS units, pocket PCs, 
laptops, and other devices. (“IS4188”, 2008). 
One of the products of this class, during TNT 06-
2 and 06-3, was the work of Creigh, Dash, and Rideout, 
which was subsequently used in the 12th ICCRTS paper titled 
“Case-Studies of Decision Support Models for Collaboration 
in Tactical Mobile Environments” by Dr. Bordetsky and Dr. 
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Friman. The case study focused on previously described 
Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIO), High-Value Target 
(HVT) tracking, and Emergency response coordination 
scenarios, in which geographically distributed command 
centers and subject matter experts collaborate to 
facilitate situational understanding and course of action 
selection. The main objective for study was to explore the 
decision making process structure and the communication 
patterns that could be observed while applying 
collaborative technology within the selected network-
centric tactical scenarios by the participating entities 
that are depicted in Figure 37. The systematic application 
of the data gathered to three of the most prevalent 
military decision support models is discussed in further 
detail, following a description of each of the models. 
 
Figure 37.   MIO Collaborative Teamwork Model 
(After Bordetsky & Friman, 2007) 
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b. Decision Model Descriptions 
(1) Simon’s Problem Solving Model - Simon’s 
model, which was presented in 1979 without the 
implementation step, is comprised of three well known 
phases, which are illustrated in Figure 38. The model 
begins with the Intelligence Phase, wherein the decision 
maker looks for indications that a problem exists; moves to 
the Design Phase, within which alternatives are determined 
and analyzed; the Choice Phase, wherein one of the 
alternatives is agreed upon; and finally the Implementation 
Phase, where the alternative is put into action (Sprague 
and Carlsson, 1982, as cited in Bordetsky & Friman, 2007). 
Bordetsky and Friman put for that this model is capable 
mapping the entire process and detection and identification 
of a HVT, although the actual use of collaborative 
processes required in the iterative decision making cycle 
is only implicit and needs to be visualized. 
 
Figure 38.   Simon’s Modified Problem Solving Model 
(After Bordetsky & Friman, 2007) 
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(2) Boyd’s OODA Loop - The OODA Loop, 
developed by USAF Colonel John Boyd, is comprised of four 
phases – Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act, as shown in 
Figure 39.  
 
Figure 39.   Boyd’s OODA Loop 
(From Spinney and Conram, 2002, as cited in Bordetsky & 
Friman, 2007) 
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Bordetsky and Friman note that the model can not be treated 
as cyclical and that most decision are based on only two 
parts of the model – Observe and Act, which misses out on 
the ever important Orientation Phase. That phase is 
important as it contributes to the Action Phase that 
represents the final decision, as well as giving direction 
to the entire organization toward speeding up the loop in 
the next iteration. While there are linkages between this 
model and the HVT scenario, as with Simon’s model, the 
collaborative process is implicit and not clearly 
emphasized.  
(3) Albert’s and Hayes’ Collaboration 
Significant Influences Model – Developed in 2006, this 
model, unlike the other two, does in fact directly include 
collaboration as an important aspect toward sound decision 
making (Figure 40). Additionally, the cyclical or 
hierarchical aspects of the previous two models are broken 
down, highlighting the strength of an organization as a 
whole organization working towards a common goal. Bordetsky 
and Friman explain that this model also maps quite 
naturally to the experimental setup encountered within the 
TNT Testbed. This is because the decision making is 
influenced by an evolutionary ‘committee’ type structure 
that is structured around the theory that each individual 
can be involved in the entire process and enjoy some 
decision making responsibilities.  It is thought that this 
free flow of information will highlight the collaborative 
phenomenon that exists within the experiments, flattening 
an inherently vertical organization into one that better 




Figure 40.   Albert’s and Hayes’ Model 
(From Albert and Hayes, 2006, as cited in Bordetsky & 
Friman, 2007) 
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c. Application of Models within TNT-MIO 
Experimentation 
Quantifying the ability of an organization to 
collaborate is no small task. The effort put forth by the 
teams of Creigh, Dash, and Rideout, and Pena and Withee 
produced a product that both intriguing and a significant 
step toward a better understanding of the phenomenon in 
general, especially in comparison to the previous work by 
Burdian and Klopson. While that research was very 
intuitive, the idea here is to show progress away form 
broad generalization and more toward comprehension. This 
should improve the participants’ ability to move from 
simple situational awareness to “situational understanding” 
(A. Bordetsky, personal interview, October 29, 2008). 
In order to apply these military decision support 
models to the HVT scenario in a way that could provide 
recommendations for the tactically-oriented collaborative 
technology tool capabilities the teams took a systematic 
approach. The teams used many of the resources which have 
been used within this thesis, to include After Action 
Reports (AAR), Executive Summaries, and interviews with 
resident experts. To obtain qualitative and quantitative 
statistics, in regards to collaborative technologies (CT), 
a Lickert Scale was developed with common “score” 
descriptions that ranged from 1-10. This scale succeeded in 
degreasing individual subjectivity, as well as facilitating 
the statistical analysis. Using this scale, a spreadsheet 
was developed and each member applied the 1-10 scale across 
the pre-selected components from the three models for all 
25 MIO events. These numbers were automatically averaged by  
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the spreadsheet in order to determine which model was the 
most appropriate, or if none was singularly successful, to 
develop a hybrid decision model. 
Although each model has its strengths and 
weaknesses, it was discovered that the hybrid model would 
have to be proposed that would combine elements from all 
three of the decision support models, taking into 
consideration the need for collaboration, but still 
allowing an individual to make a solo decisions. This was 
because, when directly applied to the HVT model, the Boyd 
and Simon models did not lend themselves to the initial 
setup of the network and the Albert-Hayes model did not 
have an execution phase, nor did it fully exploit the 
synergy developed during the collaborative process. As a 
consolation it was agreed upon by both groups that the 
intent of this group would be to develop a model most 
closely aligned with Simon’s model simply because it was 
believed to be more robust than Boyd’s model and not as 
complex as the Albert and Hayes iteration.  
The product of this decision, shown in Figure 41, 
combines the best features from all of the models while 
better incorporating collaboration and execution after a 
decision is made. Although this model is quite complete, 
especially considering the large body of knowledge that it 
covers, it still lacks a proper answer to the question of 
synergy and collaborative ties, which will be properly 
addressed in one of the proceeding visits to this subject 
by one of Dr. Bordetsky’s PhD students, Richard Bergin, in 
the next chapter. 
 66
 
Figure 41.   Collaboration Model Proposed by MIO Study Team 
(After Bordetsky & Friman, 2007) 
3. Hudgens (2008) 
Expanding upon the collaboration research done by 
Bordetsky and Friman is Lt Col Brian Hudgens, USAF, and his 
paper titled Feedback Models for Collaboration and Trust in 
Crisis Response Networks. His approach to collaboration and 
trust in crisis response networks directly contributes to a 
better understanding of interactions and relationships in 
both established and ad hoc networks. His extensive 
literature review uncovered many trends regarding the 
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assembly of unrelated organizations working toward a common 
task that pertain directly to the hurdles that have been 
experienced within the CENETIX Field Experiment Cooperative 
and the TNT Testbed, most notably the issue of having 
members with a common task, but differing constraints. 
(Stephenson and Schnitzer, 2006, as cited by Hudgens, 
2008). The hallmark of the TNT-MIO experiments is the 
combination of heterogeneous organizations that are, as 
Hudgens explains, exploring ways that they can engender 
coordination through the use of feedback loops. 
Using the fundamental components of systems theory, 
which include a series of feedback loops, identified as a 
“circle… of cause-effect relationships” (Senge, 1990, as 
cited by Hudgens, 2008), Hudgens attempts to find the 
middle ground between trust, communication strategies, and 
the commitment of resources. Trust is identified as a 
relationship governance construct that manifest itself as 
the expectation by one party that another party is both 
credible (reliable) and benevolent (Moorman, Zaltman, and 
Despande, 1993; Morgan and Hunt, 1994, as cited by Hudgens, 
2008). The second construct, communication strategy, is 
comprised of frequency, direction, modality, and content of 
communications, which can affect both qualitative and 
quantitative outcomes (Mohr and Nevin, 1990, as cited by 
Hudgens, 2008). Finally, it is asserted that the 
coordination among organizations is positively affected by 
the commitment of needed resources toward the common goal. 
This seems reasonable as it resembles a symbol of ‘good 
faith’ to all parties involved, eventually perpetuating a 
cycle of more trust, more communication, and more resources 
by all participants.Possibly the greatest contribution by 
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Lt Col Hudgens to this thesis was his explanation, borrowed 
from Stephenson and Schnitzer (2006), of the progression of 
two organizations from initial contact to a full fledged 
partnership. It should be noted that this example only 
contemplates two entities for the sake of simplicity. 
Consider if you will, that an organization (Org 1) signals 
another credible organization (Org 2) by committing 
resources toward the amelioration of a crisis situation 
(the shared goal). This commitment of resources may involve 
any number of observable investments, such as the 
construction of a communication network where none exists 
or providing a real or virtual shared workspace. Org 1 may 
also volunteer intelligence about the crisis to Org 2 and 
seek advice on a proposed course of action to solve the 
problem. Org 1’s credibility (“we are devoted to this 
common goal and willing to provide resources”) and 
benevolence (“we will share our intel and resources with 
you, and your opinion matters to us”) is subsequently 
developed as a result of the resource commitment, along 
with the initial collaborative communication strategy.  
As demonstrated in Figure 42, this engendered trust 
should result in Org 2 becoming more committed to working 
more closely with Org 1 to address the crisis, which is 
demonstrated by a reciprocal investment of resources. Org 
2’s behavior, in return, signals its credibility and 
benevolence to Org 1, completing the feedback loop and 
resulting in greater coordination. Hudgens refers to this 
pattern of events as a “virtuous” feedback process. His 
warning that this relationship could be functionally 
constrained by environmental factors, such as 
infrastructure and physical scope directly correlates with 
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the concerns of the CENETIX leadership during 
geographically dispersed interorganizational experiments. 
 
Figure 42.   Virtuous feedback process 
(From Hudgens, 2008) 
If one was to go back and examine the partnerships 
within the TNT-MIO experiments they would find that this 
drive toward virtuosity is precisely how many of the 
relationships were developed. It could also be inferred 
that the progression that many of the initial observers 
took on their way to becoming primary participants, as was 
described in chapter three of this thesis. The concept that 
a feedback loop comprised of reciprocal resource 
commitments and compelling communication strategies can  
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engender a larger degree of trust and commitment between 
organizations and develop stronger ties is valid and 
reproducible. 
4. Bergin (2008) 
The underlying theme within all of the reviewed works 
within this thesis has been the desire to resolve the 
problems that are inherent to collaboration between 
distributed entities. The newest work on the subject, from 
within the CENETIX community, comes from Mr. Richard 
Bergin, and is titled “Collaborative Network Topology 
Adaptation: Creating New Synergies”. Bergins paper may be 
the most be the most comprehensive work to date that deals 
directly with the concept of links and synergy within 
disparate groups, while intuitively asking the questions 
that may finally bring true collaborative change to the 
experiments.  This research is specifically based upon the 
scenarios and correspondence encountered during the most 
recent MIO 08-4 experiment cycle. As stated throughout this 
thesis, that particular scenario revolved around the 
identification and tracking of a possible radiological 
dispersal device (RDD) at several areas along the Eastern 
seaboard, to include the Port of Newark, New Jersey. 
Just as with the previous work from Lt Col Hudgens, 
Bergin’s work approaches the wicked problem of large-scale 
networking initiatives from a systems theory perspective. 
The work focuses on what he refers to as Synergies of 
Scale, Division of Labor, Functional Complementarities, 
Synergies of Information Sharing and Collective 
Intelligence, and Synergies of Tool and Technology 
(Corning, 2007 as cited by Bergin, 2008). It is no accident 
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that these terms are familiar, as they correspond a great 
deal with the relationship governance constructs discussed 
by Hudgens. In the case of the Bergin work, the goal is the 
observation of the development and morphing of weak and 
strong ties within the experiments. For the purpose of his 
study, Bergin defined weak ties as those that did not exist 
prior to a particular scenario within the MIO experiment, 
particularly where reciprocal services between two nodes 
did not exist prior to the field study. Strong ties are 
defined naturally the relationships that have been subject 
to reciprocation before the experiment had been 
established. Hudgens’ example would say that the strong 
ties would be a product of virtuous feedback process. It is 
Bergin’s assertion that, when one considers their “circle 
of friends”, they are less likely to get new information 
from the closest friends because of similar thought 
patterns and experiences, while people outside of that 
circle, or weak links, and provide a new perspective. It is 
for this reason that although strong links may seem the 
most beneficial, new weak links could ultimately breathe 
fresh air into an existing problem resolution. 
The concept of ties, in the case of CENETIX, is 
illustrated by Figure 43, which shows a greatly simplified 
version of the network topology during MIO 08-4. Using this 
graphic it is much easier to understand the difficulties 
that are brought about by utilizing such an incredibly 
diverse range of platforms, sensors, and geographic 
locations. These ties, which are expected to be of both the 




include trust-based social capital, expertise location, 
goal congruence, anticipation of value, access to parties, 























































Figure 43.   Simplified 08-4 MIO Links & Nodes 
(From Poulsen & Bordetsky as cited by Bergin, 2008) 
While goal congruence and expertise location have been 
previously discussed within this thesis, the concept of 
absorptive capacity is a new topic. “Absorptive capacity 
refers to the ability to recognize the value of new 
knowledge and information, and to assimilate and use it 
(Cohen and Levinthal, 1990 as cited by Bergin, 2008). 
Bergin uses the magic rule of seven ±1, developed by 
Miller, to describe the limitations that human cognitive 
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factors play within the node capacity calculation (Miller, 
G., 1956 as cited by Bergin, 2008). Much as with the trust 
discussion earlier, Szulanski’s findings are that 
additional factors constraining absorptive capacity within 
an adaptive collaborative network is the recipient’s lack 
of absorptive capacity, casual ambiguity, and arduous 
relationships between recipient and the source (Szulanski, 
G., 1996 as cited by Bergin, 2008). 
The ultimate goal of this thesis, and of the work by 
Bergin, is to enable network enabled participants to get 
information to decision makers in the fastest possible 
manner so that they can determine a well informed course of 
action. Bergin puts forth that this will more readily be 
accomplished with a better understanding of the mechanics 
behind relationships and interactions. The correlation 
between interpersonal and swift (ad-hoc) trust and strong 
and weak links, respectively, is more than practical, it is 
highly intuitive, leading one to believe that this may be 
simpler than it initially appeared. As stated earlier, the 
final parsing of the data gathered by Bergin during this 
latest experiment, filtered through the understanding that 
morphism is a part of everyday life, as well as 
collaborative experimentation, could be the most revealing 
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V. CONCLUSION  
We can no longer depend on overwhelming our 
enemies by brute force… with weapons technology. 
While we may be outnumbered, we are moving to new 
concept involving maneuvering, imagination, guile 
and finesse, supported by advanced technology. It 
is a wartime function which must be intact in 
peacetime and ready to function in war. 
Dr. James H. Babcock (1980) 
A. MAJOR CONCLUSIONS FROM RESEARCH 
In an era of mind-boggling technological advances, 
both in terms of wireless communications and situational 
awareness, new ways of managing the barrage of information 
thrust upon the tactical operator are becoming ever more 
important. Traditional approaches that prospered because of 
the military advantage within the realm of Command and 
Control (C2) and tactical communications have been negated 
to some extent by the ability of both rogue nations and 
organizations to develop solutions using commercial off the 
shelf (COTS) devices. The challenges of a collaborative 
environment, in combination with the task of dealing with 
less than perfect service quality in networks where the set 
of available resources change on the order of minutes, not 
months, (Clement, 2007) demands that a new paradigm must be 
developed if we wish to succeed. The work produced by the 
team of Klopson and Burdian was a phenomenal first step and 
the papers written Bergin, Bordetsky, Hutchins, and Hudgens 
have all made substantial contributions, but the fact 
remains that the art of collaboration in the digital realm 
is still in its infancy. 
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The specific aim of this thesis is to illuminate and 
address the collaborative advances that have been achieved 
through the Center for Network Innovation and 
Experimentation during the past seven years, while 
identifying the specific trends within that research. The 
concept of having the benefit of remote experts directly 
participating in the CENETIX Maritime Interdiction 
Operations model, which was developed by Bordetsky, Dougan, 
and Dunlap, has gone from a patchwork of disparate 
technologies to a mesh-enabled feedback loop that is no 
longer limited by the number of participants and observers, 
but by the ability of facilitators to keep everyone abreast 
of the capabilities brought to the experiments by new 
partners. Bergin would refer to this as the need to address 
the participants’ ability to integrate weak ties into an 
environment that has been built upon a base of extremely 
strong ties. The strong ties that the TNT-MIO experiments 
are bound by are from node and network perspective. 
As would be expected with any research endeavor, the 
level of understanding has dramatically increased, mainly 
because of the real-world nature of the scenarios that are 
developed by the CENETIX researchers and partners. The 
addition of more scripted avoidance schemes may be all that 
it will take to truly prove the relevance of the 
experiments. That topic will be discussed below in the 
suggestions for the future. 
1. Areas of Success 
The success stories within the CENETIX partnership are 
numerous and varied. From a collaboration stand-point, the 
ever-evolving nature of the SA environment has contributed 
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greatly to the success of the experiments. The expertise 
garnered from Eugene Bourakov, in the arena of SA 
development, to fit the dynamic needs of each experiment, 
is deserving of the most praise. Additionally, his 
groundbreaking work in the area of Self-Aligning OFDM 
(SAOFDM) antennas has been remarkable and of interest to 
almost every new partner within the experiments. The 
adaptability of these antennas has meant that we have 
barely scratched the surface of their capabilities. It is 
known that these antennas provide the missing link in 
reachback in one of the most promising areas of success for 
the MIO experiments, and that is the self-forming 
capability that has been exhibited by the mesh networks 
within the most recent maritime operations. This ability 
has successfully extended the network in a holistic manner 
between nodes in an automated manner that was not 
previously possible (TNT-MIO 08-2 AAR, 2008). 
During the utilization of the above mentioned network, 
the participants of the experiments have also improved 
their ability to work across multiple application platforms 
simultaneously, such as Groove, CENETIX SA, and JSAS. There 
is some concern, which will be discussed below, that there 
is a need for more automation and sharing between these 
particular programs. This comes specifically because of the 
way the programs are used as a backstop for one another. 
For instance, if the Groove server were to become 
unresponsive, the observers and participants would migrate 
to VC1 and the File Repository, and continue the 
experiment. This method of transitioning from program is 
not readily clear to new partners, such as was the case 
with the PANYNJ team during MIO 08-2, but upon 
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clarification and training it becomes a part of the 
experiment procedures. This method of moving from program 
to program is not optimal, but it does generally produce 
the desired results without completely stopping an 
experiment in its tracks.  
2. Areas for Improvement 
In what may appear as a bit of a contradiction, the 
ability to communicate simultaneously across multiple 
platforms, which was described as a CENETIX strength, is 
also one of the areas most in need of more attention. The 
time critical nature of the information that is sent during 
the experiment cycles is too easily put in jeopardy by a 
lack of common understanding about the procedures and 
network criteria that can cause a change in collaborative 
tool workflow. Many of the moves from one product to 
another are a result of network connectivity problems that 
are too easily misdiagnosed as a result of inadequate 
network performance data. As one of the primary Research 
Associates involved in the TNT-MIO project, Michael Clement 
stated that within network-centric operations, “the task of 
mapping every link within a single highly mobile unit, let 
alone the complex interconnections between join and 
coalition forces, would take a heroic effort.” (Clement, 
2007). Numerous products have been used in an effort to 
maintain the reliability of the network, in turn increasing 
the efficiency of collaboration within the Testbed, but 
there is still room for improvement. 
There are areas that are not specific to our 
experiments such what Mercado referred to as the separation 
of tasks within the Tactical Operations Center (TOC). In an 
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effort to encourage participation by all parties, and as a 
result of unclear directions about the platform switches 
mentioned above, there is the possibility for a lack of 
queue discipline. Perry describes this as the phenomenon 
wherein a seemingly undisciplined network produces 
extraneous comments as a result of all participants 
erroneously feeling that their comments are critical, when 
in fact they are merely observations that should be 
recorded outside the primary communication channel (Perry 
et al., 2002). This problem, now that it is recognized, has 
been addressed to some extent by predetermined protocols 
and the designation of a single person to regulate 
communication.   
B. FUTURE RESEARCH RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Collaborative Tool Integration 
In the years since the TNT_MIO experiments started 
there have been any number of collaborative tools used in 
an attempt to find a tool that could satisfy the needs of 
all of the stated desired tactical missions. The most 
recent incarnation of this desire is the use of the web 
portal, such as the Joint Situational Awareness System 
(JSAS) developed for the Port Authority of New York and New 
Jersey. It was determined during the MIO 08-4 experiment 
cycle, despite a preconception that JSAS would be able to 
provide the needed SA, that PANYNJ was still in need of 
numerous CENETIX tools that had previously been proven as 
effective. In this specific case, JSAS lacked the ability 
to display MIO specific intelligence that was readily 
provided by the NPS Situational Awareness environment. (A. 
Bordetsky, personal interview, October 29, 2008). The 
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previously noted need for an integrated tool or the ability 
to automate the interaction of the current toolset is still 
in need of a solution. 
2. Data Sharing Alerts 
The current network configuration, which includes the 
presence of remote experts in rad/nuc identification and 
biometrics consolidation, determines that numerous tools 
are necessary to perform the stated duties during Maritime 
Interdiction Operations. In light of that fact it is 
imperative that a method be developed to adapt the alerts 
that are set forth by each tool into a common application 
or portal that is automatically populated.  This solution 
should be developed as a result of an investigation into 
which variation of this tool could serve the greatest 
number of the participants. Included in the criteria should 
be a method to provide this functionality in a ‘lite’ form 
that would be functional at the Boarding Officer level. 
3. Detection of Target in Avoidance Mode 
The ability of MIO participants to detect targets that 
are pre-designated in a geographical area has increased 
dramatically, as seen in experiments all the way up through 
MIO 08-4, but the area that warrants further research is 
the detection of dynamic sources, or those that are 
attempting to avoid discovery (A. Bordetsky, personal 
interview, October 29, 2008). The detection of an actual 
radiological dispersal device would demand that the ability 
to discover a nuclear agent as it passed a sensor, as was 
proven using ARAM in MIO 08-2, and the added ability to 
follow the suspected delivery vehicle to its destination if 
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it were not in fact stopped and tagged. This area of 
research would be of special interest to metropolitan 
protection forces, such as those in the New York City area, 
where an activated sensor in a tunnel heading in or out of 
the city or past a buoy in the harbor area only verifies 
that a suspected agent passed the sensor. Instant 
communications to local authorities in a manner that 
coincides with remote experts would be an immense step in 
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